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WHEN THE LIFEBLOOD OF COMPETITION
CREATES A LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION:
WAITS V. FRITO-LAY, INC.
He sounds "like how you'd sound if you drank a quart of bourbon,
smoked a pack of cigarettes and swallowed a pack of razor blades
.... Late at night. After not sleeping for three days."' Should
such a distinctive voice be protected from imitation by a commercial
advertiser? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.2 that Tom Waits's3 voice, described above,
deserves protection.4 This holding has far-reaching implications
for singers and advertisers alike because of the constraints it places
on advertising freedom.
I. BACKGROUND
At the suggestion of its advertiser, Frito-Lay made a radio
advertisement for SalsaRio Doritos in a style suggestive of one of
Tom Waits's songs.5 During auditions for singers, the advertiser,
Tracy-Locke, looked for a singer who could sing in a gravelly style.6
While executives from Tracy-Locke and Frito-Lay were displeased
with initial efforts using a singer with a deep "bluesy" voice,7 they
did approve of Stephen Carter, a professional musician recommend-
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
2 Id. at 1093.
' Although Waits is not a mainstream music star, he received Rolling Stone magazine's
1987 Critic's Award for Best Live Performance, and SPIN magazine named him on their
March 1990 list of the ten most interesting recording artists of the last five years. In
addition, the singer has appeared and played on television shows such as "Saturday Night
Live' and "Late Night with David Letterman" and has been featured in articles in Time,
Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal, among others. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
4 Id. at 1112.
' Id. In fact, when the advertiser, Tracy-Locke, presented its idea for the advertisement
to Frito-Lay, Waits's 1976 song "Step Right Up" was played to demonstrate the feeling the
commercial should portray. Id. at 1097.
6 The court stated that Tracy-Locke seemed to want a singer who could capture the
feeling of Waits's song "Step Right Up," in addition to being able to imitate Waits's voice.
Id. at 1097.
7Id.
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ed as someone who could imitate Tom Waits.8
Carter's imitation was so convincing that the executives were
concerned about legal problems from its use.' Tracy-Locke's
managing vice-president, Robert Grossman, consulted the com-
pany's attorney on the day the commercial was to be released. 10
The attorney advised Grossman that although there was a risk of
legal problems because of a recent case recognizing the protecta-
bility of a distinctive voice," a suit by Waits would not stand
because there is no protectability of a singer's style of music. 2
Grossman then warned Frito-Lay of the legal risks of using Carter's
voice, but still recommended the Carter version and agreed that
Tracy-Locke would indemnify Frito-Lay should a legal controversy
arise.1
3
The advertisement for SalsaRio Doritos ran on over 250 radio
stations in sixty-one markets.1 4 Upon hearing the ad and realiz-
ing that people might mistakenly think he endorsed Doritos, Waits
filed an action against Tracy-Locke and Frito-Lay seeking $2.3
million in compensatory damages for misappropriation under
California law and false endorsement under the Lanham Act.'
5
At trial, Waits prevailed with the jury awarding him $375,000 in
compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages for the
voice misappropriation claim, and $100,000 for the Lanham Act
claim.'6 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the damage award
under the Lanham Act as duplicative, but otherwise affirmed the
' Carter had performed Waits's songs with his band for ten years and had perfected his
imitation. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1047 (1993).
" During the recording session, Tracy-Locke's executive producer asked Carter to tone
down his imitation of Waits. Id. at 1097-98. In addition, the producer recorded an
alternative version of the ad with a different singer. Id. But Frito-Lay and the creative
team did not approve of the results, and the original version was used. Id.
10 Id. The commercial was broadcast in September and October of 1988 on over 250 radio
stations in 61 markets across the country. Id.
1 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that voice misappropri-
ation is a legal cause of action in California), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
12 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
1 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. Waits also received attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act. Id.
[Vol. 1:353354
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trial court's decision.' 7
II. THE NINTH CIRCuITs ANALYSIS IN WAITS
In Waits, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court and reaffirmed
its previous decision in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,18 a case that
recognized as a California tort voice misappropriation, which
imposes liability on anyone who uses a professional singer's
distinctive voice for commercial purposes without the singer's
consent.' 9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit decided a question of
first impression-whether under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 2°
one can recover for false endorsement.
On the issue of voice misappropriation, the Waits defendants
argued against the viability of the tort on two grounds: first, that
the Midler decision was "impliedly overruled" by the Supreme
Court's decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc. ;2' and second, that the tort of voice misappropriation, an-
17 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1111 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993). Thus, the final amount the court awarded was $2,500,000.
18 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
19 Id. at 463 (holding that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely
known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California").
20 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3946
(1988). The Lanham Act provides:
(aXi) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.
21 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141 (1989), which held that Florida statute designed to protect boat hull designs was
preempted by federal patent law), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
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nounced in Midler, was preempted by the federal Copyright Act.'
In arguing that Bonito Boats overruled Midler, the defendants
contended that the Midler decision ignored two cases, Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 23 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting,24 which were cited in Bonito Boats for the proposition
that "publicly known design and utilitarian ideas which were
unprotected by patent" are expressly unprotected.' The defen-
dants reasoned that the citation in Bonito Boats to Sears and
Compco reaffirmed the broad preemption principles for which those
two cases once stood; therefore, the defendants argued, since Midler
did not cite to Sears and Compco, the case was incorrectly decided.
The Ninth Circuit, however, pointed to several flaws in the
defendants' arguments. First, the court noted that Bonito Boats
warns against reading a "broad preemptive principle" into Sears
and Compco, and that cases subsequent to Sears and Compco
retreat from any such broad interpretation.26 Accordingly, the
court held that Bonito Boats does not sanction the liberal reading
of Sears and Compco that defendants argued should preempt
Waits's state misappropriation claim.27  The Waits court also
recognized a state's authority to protect entertainers' "right of
publicity," a power implied by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.' According to the court,
because the defense cited cases decided before Zacchini, the Midler
decision was still good authority.29
' Id. The court reviewed these two questions of law de novo.
23376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding that because of federal patent law, state may not prohibit
copying of article that is unpatented or uncopyrighted).
24 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (holding that copier of plaintifis unpatented fluorescent lighting
fixtures was not liable because, where article is unprotected by patent or copyright, state law
may not ban others from copying that article).
25 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 152 (1989)).
' Id. at 1099. Additionally, the Waits defendants argued that earlier cases that denied
entertainers' suits for performance imitations based on federal copyright preemption were
correctly decided because they relied on Sears and Compco. Id2 7 d. at 1099.
Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), in which
the Supreme Court deemed state right-of-publicity law was not preempted by federal patent
and copyright law). See also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing Zacchini
decision and its contribution to development of right of publicity).2 Id. at 1100.
[Vol. 1:353356
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For their second argument, the Waits defendants asserted that
the voice misappropriation action is preempted by the Copyright
Act.3" The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the
Midler holding that a voice is not copyrightable subject matter. 1
According to the court, Waits sought to protect his identity as
represented in his distinctive voice, a claim which contained
elements "different in kind" from copyright elements32 and, thus,
was not preempted by federal copyright law.'
In addition to upholding the validity of the California tort of voice
misappropriation, the Ninth Circuit examined a question of first
impression in Waits: whether or not false endorsement claims are
properly brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 4 In its
analysis, the Waits court initially noted that other jurisdictions
have interpreted the language of section 43(a) as supporting false
endorsement claims. 3' The court then cited other cases that
recognized well-known plaintiffs' false endorsement claims. These
cases involved the unsanctioned impersonation of distinctive
attributes when those distinctive features constituted an unregis-
tered commercial "trademark."36
30 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 17 U.S.C. §
301(bX1)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993). A state cause of action escapes copyright
preemption if its subject matter "does not come within the subject matter of copyright ...
including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(bXl) (1988).
31 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100. The Midler court held that a voice is not copyrightable
because copyright protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression" and a voice is not "fixed." Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992).
3 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.
33 Id.
" Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The Lanham Act provides civil
liability for persons who make false designations of origin or false representations with
regard to commercial goods and services. See infra note 74 (providing text of statute).
m Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106 (citing Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Wildlife Internationale, Inc. v. Clements, 591 F. Supp. 1542 (S.D. Oh. 1984); Better
Business Bureau v. Medical Directors, Inc., 681 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1982); and Geisel v.
Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
' Id. (citing Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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In support of the cited case law, the court pointed to the 1988
Lanham Act amendments." In particular, the court stated that
amended section 43(a) now expressly prohibits "the use of any
symbol or device which is likely to deceive consumers as to the
association, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by another
person."38 Based on these considerations, the court determined
that false endorsement claims, even those involving an unofficial
simulation of a recognizable voice, are valid under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.39
III. LEGAL HISTORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF A VOICE
A. VOICE MISAPPROPRIATION
The tort of voice misappropriation stems from the right of
publicity (i.e., that a person has a right to control the commercial
property rights in his or her persona). 40 Thus, when an advertiser
imitates some aspect of a plaintiffs persona for commercial profit,
the advertiser has infringed on the plaintiff's right of publicity.41
The first formal recognition of this proprietary right came in
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,42 in which
the court acknowledged that an assignee of a baseball player had
37 Id. (holding that, although 1988 amendments to Lanham Act did not become effective
until November 1989, more than one year after Frito-Lay's offensive commercial aired,
amendments were useful as codification of earlier case law that construed section 43(a) to
encompass false endorsement claims).
36 Id. (pointing to legislative history of 1988 amendments, which clarifies that, "in
retaining the statute's original terms 'symbol or device' in the definition of 'trademark,'
Congress approved the broad judicial interpretation of these terms to include distinctive
sounds and physical appearance").
39Id. at 1107. The court ruled that Waits had standing to sue under the Lanham Act,
even though he was not in competition with the defendants, because of the likelihood that
the "wrongful use of his professional trademark, his voice, would injure him commercially."
Id. at 1110. Although the court affirmed judgment for Waits based on his Lanham Act claim,
they vacated the associated damage award as duplicative. Id. at 1112.
'o Steven T. Margolin, Comment, From Imitation to Litigation: Expanded Protection for
Commercial Property Rights in Identity, 96 DICK. L. REV. 491 (1992).
"' White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
game show hostess had right of publicity claim against advertiser whose ad depicted robot
dressed similar to plaintiff); Margolin, supra note 40, at 491.
42 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that person has right of publicity in value of his
photograph), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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the right to prevent unauthorized commercial use of the player's
identity.43 Subsequently, legal commentators began to lay the
groundwork for development of the right," and courts expanded
a person's right to protect her proprietary interest in her own
identity.
For example, in the landmark case of Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' the Ninth Circuit held that a person is
entitled to legal protection of the proprietary interest she has in her
own identity." Further support for the right of publicity arose in
the Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co. 47 Although this case turned on a constitutional
issue,48 the decision impacted development of the publicity right
because the Supreme Court repeatedly mentioned the right as an
identifiable legal principle. 49  After this recognition by the Su-
preme Court, other cases extended the right of publicity to cover
additional aspects of plaintiffs' personas.5 °
The Ninth Circuit first expanded an individual's proprietary
interest in his identity to include a voice in Midler v. Ford Motor
Co.51 There, the court held that Bette Midler stated a tort cause
4 Id. at 868.
"See generally Harold R. Gordon, Rights of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and
History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553, 554 (1960); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966) (commenting on
development of right of publicity); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw &
CONTEmP. PROBS. 203 (1954); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
4 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
' Id. at 827. In Motschenbacher, a tobacco company altered a picture of a professional
race car driver's distinct car and used the picture in a cigarette advertisement. Although the
picture did not clearly identify the driver, the court of appeals noted that the advertisements
caused some people to infer that the driver sponsored defendant's cigarettes. The court
expanded the right of publicity to encompass the case. Id.
47 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
"Id. at 569-79 (discussing whether First Amendment protects press from having to pay
performer for making unauthorized reproduction of his human cannonball performance on
local news).
4, Margolin, supra note 40, at 503 ("[The] Zacchini decision gave the right of publicity
something it had previously been lacking-respectability.").
"'Id. See supra note 41 (discussing White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1992), in which defendants' ad appropriated appearance of game show hostess).
"
1 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513 (1992). One legal commentator stated that the Midler decision "will likely prove to be
the precedent for the 1990s." Margolin, supra note 40, at 506 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 4.14[C], at 4-89 (1988)).
1994] 359
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of action under California law against Ford Motor Company and its
advertising agency, Young & Rubicam, Inc., for the unauthorized
imitation of her voice in an automobile advertisement.
5 2
To arrive at this conclusion, the court engaged in a series of
analyses,53 involving the possibility of First Amendment protec-
tion, the question of federal copyright preemption, and an examina-
tion of California Civil Code sections. The court initially noted that
a First Amendment defense is sometimes available for the media
when it reproduces likenesses or sounds, depending on the media's
purpose behind using a person's identity.54 For instance, a
defense for reproduction may exist if the purpose is "informative or
cultural."55 Yet, if the purpose "merely exploits the individual
portrayed, immunity will not be granted."6 In Midler, no First
Amendment defense was available to Ford Motor Company and
Young & Rubicam because they used Midler's unique sound
purposely to exploit her identity.5"
The Midler court also determined that federal copyright law did
not preempt the plaintiffs claim.58 The court analogized Midler's
52 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. In Midler, Ford Motor Company and Young & Rubicam, Inc.
embarked upon an advertising campaign in which they tried to get original singers to
perform their popular songs. To that end, Young & Rubicam sought Bette Midler, a
nationally known singer, to perform her 1973 song "Do You Want To Dance." After Midler's
agent informed the ad agency that Midler was not interested, the agency found Ula Hedwig,
a backup singer to Midler for ten years. They instructed Hedwig to "sound as much as
possible like the Bette Midler record," and after the commercial aired, many people remarked
to Midler that they thought she was the singer in the commercial. Midler subsequently sued
Ford and Young & Rubicam for the "sound alike" commercial. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the
decision and held that the Ford and Young & Rubicam imitation was voice misappropriation
under California law. Midler did not bring a claim under the Lanham Act. Id. at 461-63.
5 3 Id. at 462-63 (reviewing the following provisions: U.S. CONST. amend. I; 17 U.S.C. §
102(a); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985); and CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (West
Supp. 1994)).
"Midler, 849 F. Supp. at 462.
5 Id.
"Id. (citing Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal
of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979)).
57 Id.
58 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The Midler Court distinguished Sinatra
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906
(1971), in which Nancy Sinatra sued for imitation of her voice and style when the defendants
used "These Boots Are Made For Walkin," a song closely associated with her, in an ad. The
Sinatra defendants had paid the copyright owner for a license to use the song and its
[Vol. 1:353360
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/6
1994] WAITS V. FRITO-LAY, INC.
case to Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.," an earlier case in which a
company imitated a celebrity's voice in an advertisement. In Lahr,
the plaintiff was allowed to recover because his voice was distinc-
tive in pitch, accent, inflection, and sound.'
Finally, the court examined whether Midler could recover under
sections 334461 and 99062 of the California Civil Code. Under
section 3344, which allows a plaintiff to recover when a defendant
misuses the plaintiffs distinctive characteristics, the court deter-
mined that the defendants did not use Midler's name or any of the
other attributes covered under the section, and therefore, Midler
arrangements; Sinatra based her unfair competition claim on an argument that her
arrangement had a secondary meaning entitled to protection. However, the Sinatra court
held that to allow the singer to recover for defendants' use of the song would "clash" with
federal copyright law. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717-718. The Midler court held that, unlike
Sinatra, Midler did not claim that her song had a secondary meaning and did not seek to
prevent the defendants from using her song. Therefore, Midler's suit was not preempted by
federal copyright law. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
0 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that comic entertainer had cause of action for
unfair competition when actor imitated entertainer's distinct voice in "Lestoil" advertisement
featuring duck).
Id. at 259. Although the Midler court looked to this early case of voice imitation for
support, it distinguished Lahr as an unfair competition case in which the defendant's
wrongdoing saturated and diminished the plaintiffs audience. Id. at 462. Midler did not
have a claim for unfair competition because the defendants' short commercial would not have
saturated her audience or curtailed her market. Id.
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985), which provides:
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases
of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior
consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal
guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof ....
Id.
6 CAL. CIrV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1994), which states:
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases
of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from
the person or persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely
transferable ....
Id. (emphasis added).
9
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could not recover.' Since section 3344 did not apply, the court
used section 990, which provides for an action against a defendant
who uses a deceased plaintiffs particular traits," to create the
California tort of voice misappropriation. The court reasoned that
because section 990 recognizes a deceased person's property rights
in his or her particular traits, then by analogy with the common
law, proprietary interests in personal identity are also property
rights.' The court then held that appropriation of such common-
law rights is a tort in California. 66
In creating the voice misappropriation tort, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that a voice is a special characteristic unique to every
person67 and that the defendants used Midler's voice to capitalize
on her commercial success." Accordingly, Midler had a cause of
action against the defendants for the misappropriation of her
voice.69 The Ninth Circuit's recognition of voice misappropriation
is significant because the tort was the primary vehicle providing
recovery for Tom Waits in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.7° In fact, voice
a' Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513 (1992); see generally Charles Karlin, Note, A Rose By Any Other Voice? Commercial
Voice Misappropriation in Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 19 Sw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1142-49
(1990) (discussing Section 3344 analysis in Midler and comparing "look-alike" cases to
"sound-alike" cases in support of Midler decision). Even though Section 3344 did not apply
in Midler, the court held that a possible common-law cause of action may remain. Midler,
849 F.2d at 463. According to the court, a common-law cause of action may remain because
§ 3344(g) provides that its remedies are merely "cumulative" and implies that a common-law
cause of action may exist. Id.
"See supra note 62 (quoting language of Section 990).
"Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
"Id. (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.
1974), which held that defendant cigarette company invaded proprietary interest of race car
driver's identity with ad featuring photograph of driver's distinctive red car). The Midler
court distinguished the facts of Motschenbacher, but held that defendants imitated Midler's
voice to create the impression that Midler was singing for them, just as the cigarette
company used Motschenbacher's car as a symbol to intimate that the driver was associated
with their product. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
7 Id. ("The human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested. We are
all aware that a friend is at once known by a few words on the phone .... These
observations hold true of singing...
"Id. at 463.
"Id. The court, however, limited its decision: "We hold only that when a distinctive
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in
California." Id.
70 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).
362
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misappropriation was the only claim under which the Ninth Circuit
allowed Waits to recover damages.7'
B. THE LANHAM ACT
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers and
competitors from misrepresentations about products and servic-
es.72 The Act applies not only to trademark infringement, but also
to claims that involve deception resulting from unfair competi-
tion.73 The recent amendment to the Lanham Act7 4 expanded
protection to include implied claims about a product that are
deceptive.75 Thus, advertisers must be concerned not only that
their advertising is free from deception, but also that their
71 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing amount of damages Waits
recovered).
72 Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see
generally Sharon Chester-Taxin, Will The Real Bette Midler Please Stand Up? The Future
of Celebrity Sound-Alike Recordings, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 165 (1992)
(discussing applicability and scope of Lanham Act).
"' Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). To maintain a
cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove three elements:
(1) involvement of goods and services, (2) effect on interstate commerce, and (3) false
designation of origin or false description of goods or services. Included in the third element
is an inquiry into whether a likelihood of consumer confusion will result from the false
representations. Id.; see also Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d
704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982) (listing six factors to consider to determine likelihood of consumer
confusion); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
to get actual damages, plaintiff must prove that buying public was actually deceived). See
generally Elaine Windholz, Whose Voice Is It Anyway? Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 8 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 201 (1989) (discussing sound-alike litigants' likely success under Lanham
Act).
74 Trademark Law Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3395 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)).
7 Section 43(a) now provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses
... any word, term, name, symbol, or device... or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which (a) is likely to cause confusion ... or to
deceive as to the affiliation ... or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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advertisements do not imply false claims.7"
Perhaps the most significant modern application of the Lanham
Act to a celebrity is Allen v. National Video, Inc.,7 in which a
district court applied the Act to a video chain's advertisement
involving a Woody Allen look-alike. In Allen, the court used the
three-element test of section 43(a)78 and inquired whether the
advertisement had created a likelihood of consumer confusion.79
According to the court, the first two elements-involvement of
goods and services and effect on interstate commerce-were easily
satisfied. 0
To determine the third element, the likelihood of consumer
confusion, the court analyzed the facts using a six factor test.8 '
Under the first factor, the court evaluated the strength of the
plaintiffs marks. Because Woody Allen's name and likeness were
well-known to the public, the court concluded that the marks were
strong. 2 Second, the court examined the similarity of the plain-
tiffs and the defendants' marks. Although the look-alike photo-
graph was not, as a matter of law, Allen's photograph, the court
nonetheless determined that the resemblance between the look-
alike and Allen was strong and undisputed. Because of this
' See also Paul Batista, Lanham Act Revision May Spur Commercial Defamation Claims,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 40 (discussing likelihood of new actions against implied claims
by advertisers arising under new amendment to Lanham Act). See generally Chester-Taxin,
supra note 72, at 173-77 (discussing ways advertisers and their agencies can protect
themselves from sound-alike liability under Lanham Act).
" 610 F. Supp. 612, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Allen, Woody Allen alleged that defendants'
advertisement appropriated his face and implied his endorsement. The advertisement
portrayed a customer, with the same physical features as Allen, holding a National Video
V.I.P. Card and standing next to two video cassettes of Allen's movies Annie Hall and
Bananas. The advertisement, which ran in the March 1984 issue of Video Review and in the
April 1984 issue of Take One, featured the headline: "Become a V.I.P. at National Video.
Well Make You Feel Like a Star." The ad in Video Review contained a disclaimer that a
celebrity double was used in the advertisement. Id. at 617-18.
78 See supra note 73 (listing three elements involved in Lanham Act claim).
79 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627; see infra note 81 (listing six factors used to determine
likelihood of consumer confusion).
80 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627.
8' Id. The six factors include: (1) strength of plaintiffs marks and name; (2) similarity
of plaintiffs and defendant's marks; (3) proximity of plaintiffs and defendant's products; (4)
evidence of actual confusion as to source or sponsorship; (5) sophistication of defendant's
audience; and (6) defendant's good or bad faith. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity
Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982).8 2 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627.
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/6
WAITS V. FRITO-LAY, INC.
resemblance, the court held that the "marks" were sufficiently
similar to satisfy the second factor.' Looking at the proximity of
the products, the court noted that the public identifies Allen with
movies, and that Allen's and the defendants' movie audiences over-
lapped."
Regarding evidence of actual confusion, the court refused to
consider a consumer survey that Allen had offered as evidence of
confusion. The court noted that although evidence of actual
confusion would support a likelihood of confusion, such evidence
was not required under the six-factor analysisa.8 In determining
consumer sophistication, the court determined that although the
average reader of Video Review or the average movie rental
customer is likely to be fairly sophisticated about movies, these
consumers, as well as less sophisticated consumers, could be
confused."M Finally, the court suggested that defendants acted in
bad faith. The defendants admitted that they intended to evoke an
association with Woody Allen when they designed the advertise-
ment. This admission was sufficient for the court to find that the
defendants were aware of a risk of consumer confusion and possibly
had suspect motives.8 7 Consequently, Allen prevailed under the
Lanham Act.'M
03Id.
84 Id. at 628.
Id. Although the court refused to rely on the consumer survey Allen submitted as
evidence of actual confusion, the court did not specify what evidence, if any, it would consider
as evidence of confusion.
Id.
Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
eI Id. at 628; see also Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(allowing Woody Allen to succeed in second case in which he alleged that clothing store
violated Lanham Act with its advertisement containing look-alike playing clarinet). In Allen
v. Men's World Outlet the court held that despite the ad's disclaimer that a look-alike was
used, a likelihood of consumer confusion existed over Allen's endorsement of or involvement
with the clothing store. To determine likelihood of confusion, the court engaged in an
analysis of the six factors discussed supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. The court
reasoned that even though defendants did not intend to fool consumers into thinking that
Allen was pictured in the ad, defendants admitted they designed the ad to evoke an
association with Allen. Therefore, because the store was aware of a risk of consumer
confusion, this militated against a finding of innocent motives on the defendants' part. The
court found a likelihood of consumer confusion sufficient to sustain Allen's Lanham Act
claim. Allen v. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. at 369.
1994] 365
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One court, however, has refused to apply the Lanham Act to a
celebrity's claim of voice infringement. This refusal occurred in an
early case, Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.." In Booth, an actress
claimed that a commercial wrongfully imitated a voice she had used
in a situation comedy series. The court rejected this claim,
emphasizing that the actress and the defendant were not in
competition. In contemporary cases, however, there is no longer
the requirement that a plaintiff and defendant be in competition for
a plaintiff to prevail under the Lanham Act.90
IV. ANALYSIS
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. is significant for two reasons. First,
Waits confirms the precedent established by the Ninth Circuit in
Midler, which allows a professional singer to recover for voice
misappropriation. 9' Second, the case addresses a question of first
impression in the Ninth Circuit: whether to apply the Lanham
Act92 to a person's identity as represented in his or her voice.93
In this debate, celebrities would argue that the decision is correctly
decided because it protects their interests in distinct personal
attributes. Advertisers, on the other hand, would contend that
voice misappropriation restricts advertising rights and that the
Lanham Act should not be applied so broadly. Although there are
merits to both positions, Waits v. Frito-Lay is correctly decided.
A. VOICE MISAPPROPRIATION
Some critics of the Waits decision may attempt to distinguish the
case from Midler, which created the California tort of voice
misappropriation," to claim that Waits is not a proper case for
8362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
90 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 628; see also James Burroughs, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc.,
540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that competition between plaintiff and defendant
is not involved in test for trademark infringement).
91 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1099-1102 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1047 (1993).
"See supra Section III B (discussion of Lanham Act).
93 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106.
" Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding singer's voice
misappropriation cause of action), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
366 [Vol. 1:353
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/6
WAITS V. FRITO-LAY, INC.
recovery under the relatively new tort. Such critics may argue that
the Waits defendants, unlike the Midler defendants, did not
deliberately intend to imitate the plaintiff in order to sell their
product, or that Bette Midler is a more well-known singer than
Tom Waits and thus deserves more protection. However, applying
the Midler holding 5 to the Waits facts, it should be clear that
Waits is a proper case for recovery under the California tort of voice
misappropriation.
Like Midler, in which the defendants' intent to imitate Midler's
voice was clear," the defendants in Waits similarly intended to
imitate Tom Waits.97 The defendants had Waits's song "Step
Right Up" in mind when they formulated the idea for their
commercial; Carter was recommended to the advertising agency as
someone who could do a good Tom Waits imitation.98
Tom Waits's degree of fame, though probably less than Midler's,
should not be an issue. When the Midler court created voice
misappropriation, it held that the tort applies to a distinctive voice
of a professional singer whose voice is widely known. 9 Tracy-
Locke played Waits's recorded version of his song "Step Right Up"
to Frito-Lay in the initial presentation to the company to illustrate
the mood they wanted the commercial to portray. The defendants
then sought out a performer who could imitate Waits's special
singing voice. Consequently, Waits's voice can be labeled as
"distinctive." In addition, Waits has recorded more than seventeen
albums and has played to sold-out audiences in the United States,
"Id. (holding that when distinctive voice of professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell product, sellers have committed tort in California).
"Id. (holding that defendants intended to imitate Midler because they first asked her
to perform song personally).
' Although the Waits defendants did not make this argument, critics could argue that
there was no plan to imitate Waits because: (1) the defendants did not ask Waits to perform
the commercial, as Ford asked Midler; (2) the defendants made an alternate recording with
a singer who did not sound like Waits in case the Carter version was an unacceptable
imitation; and (3) the defendants consulted an attorney about a possible cause of action and
were satisfied that no such cause of action existed.
"Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
"Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1513 (1992). Notably, the court did not set standards to determine the meanings of
"distinctive," "professional," or "widely known."
1994] 367
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Canada, Europe, Japan, and Australia."° These musical achieve-
ments qualify Waits as a "professional singer." Similarly, Waits is
widely known.101 According to the Waits court, the "widely
known" element of voice misappropriation is satisfied under
California law if a plaintiffs voice is "known to a large number of
people throughout a relatively large geographic area."' °2 Even if
Waits does not have the same degree of fame as Bette Midler, his
touring schedule and professional recognition 3 show that he
deserves to be considered "widely known" for the purposes of
recovery under voice misappropriation.
Therefore, because Waits is a professional singer with a widely
known distinctive voice, he deserves protection from voice misap-
propriation. This result is especially valid since the defendants
intended to imitate Waits.
B. LANHAM ACT
Although not as strong as Woody Allen's "mark," Waits's mark in
his voice is arguably strong enough to satisfy the first factor under
the six factor test.' ° Certainly, Waits has made a considerable
investment in his unique public image. The second factor, similari-
ty of the marks, also weighs in Waits's favor. Carter's imitation of
Waits was well-rehearsed and very similar to Waits's style.05
Another factor supporting Waits is the proximity component. This
factor was satisfied in Allen v. National Video because the court
decided that National Video's audience and Allen's movie viewers
overlapped."°  In Waits, there is similarly evidence that the
Doritos advertisement, which was directed at young males, shared
an audience with Waits. 0 7
'00 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
101 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing aspects of Waits's publicity).
'02 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1102 (emphasis in the original). Noting that "well known" is a
relative term, the court stated that the amount of damages would reflect how well-known a
plaintiff is. Id. (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974)). Thus, a less well-known plaintiff is not precluded from recovery.
103 See supra note 3 (discussing Waits's professional recognition as singer).
" See supra note 82 (discussing strength of Allen's mark).
'05 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing Carter's imitation of Waits).
' See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing overlapping audiences).
107 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing consumer confusion).
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The fourth factor, evidence of actual confusion, was supplied
through direct testimony in Waits,"° even though according to
the court in Allen v. National Video such direct evidence is not
required. 19 With regard to consumer sophistication, the fifth
factor, one can argue that radio listeners would be fairly sophisti-
cated and thus able to distinguish Waits's voice from that of an
imitator. However, in Allen v. National Video, the court held that
many consumers were likely to be confused about the look-alike
advertisement even though they were fairly sophisticated movie
viewers."0  Therefore, under the Allen analysis, the level of
consumer sophistication should not prevent Waits from succeeding.
Finally, there is an implication of bad faith on the part of the
Waits defendants. In Allen v. National Video, the court held that
the defendants had dubious motives because they admitted to
designing the advertisement with Allen in mind and were aware of
the risk of consumer confusion."' Likewise, the Waits defendants
were aware of this risk because they intended to engage a singer
who could imitate Tom Waits; they recorded an alternate version
with a different singer in case Carter sounded too much like Waits;
and they consulted an attorney about a possible lawsuit by
Waits. 1
12
Considering all six factors, there is sufficient support for a
likelihood of consumer confusion to satisfy the third element of a
Lanham Act false endorsement claim. Allowing plaintiffs like
Waits to recover under the Lanham Act is not an extension of the
Act, but rather an application of the federal statutory tort to an
aspect of a celebrity's persona.
C. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON THE HOLDING
Although Waits correctly extends potential relief to celebrities
whose voices are misappropriated, the case's holding may be too
" See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing consumer confusion).
'09 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of actual confusion).
"o See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing consumer sophistication as
relates to possible confusion).
. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing defendants' bad faith).
11 See supra notes 3-14 (discussing facts of Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
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broad. That is, under Waits, it is difficult to draw a line between
actionable claims of voice misappropriation and claims that should
fail. Consequently, in the future, courts should consider limitations
to this tort. Specifically, defenses should be available for First
Amendment parody, absence of confusion, and cases of character
rather than real person appropriation.
First, a line must be drawn between First Amendment cases such
as parody or media cases, which are protected, and imitation cases,
which receive no First Amendment protection. For example, when
a party makes a parody of an existing trademark, the intent is to
amuse the public,113 and the party is not liable for trademark
infringement114 with one potential caveat: the court in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc. " 5 held that defendants' First
Amendment parody arguments are best confined to non-commercial
areas.1 6 Thus, the First Amendment parody defense should limit
a plaintiffs voice misappropriation action (at least) in noncommer-
cial contexts.
A second limit on the tort of voice misappropriation should be in
cases in which there is no actual confusion.1 7 For example, when
a comedian like Rich Little imitates celebrities' voices, everyone
recognizes the imitation and no one is confused about the speaker's
identity. Arguably, when there is no confusion, no interest of a
plaintiff has been appropriated; therefore, the plaintiffs voice does
not merit protection in that situation.
Finally, the Waits holding should be limited to real persons. For
example, when an advertisement imitates a voice that an actress
has developed on a television show, the imitation should not
constitute infringement of the actress's rights in her voice or
identity."' However, as a possible exception, when a character
113 Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing
Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079,
1079-80 n.4 (1986)).
114 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
's 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
116 Id. at 1401 ("The difference between a 'parody' and a 'knock-off' is the difference
between fun and profit.").
7 Although evidence of actual confusion existed in Midler and Waits, the Ninth Circuit
did not emphasize that confusion was necessary to recover under voice misappropriation.
"" See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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has become inextricably intertwined with the actor who developed
the character, the actor may have a right of publicity action against
anyone who appropriates that character.119 Still, any such cause
of action should be limited to cases in which the appropriation was
made for a commercial purpose. 20 But in most cases, recovery
for appropriation of a plaintiffs identity should be limited to real
persons.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Waits decision will negatively affect advertisers by
repressing their freedom to design creative advertisements, the
holding is a step in the right direction toward protecting celebrities'
interests in their unique characteristics. Waits furthers the
development of the right of publicity as well as the potential
situations for application of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Yet,
because the holding is unduly broad, it should be applied narrowly
so as to prevent plaintiffs from taking unfair advantage of its wide
scope.
JENNIFER L. HOWELL
'o McFarland v. Miller, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1586 (3d Cir. January 25, 1994) (holding
that triable issue of fact exists as to whether actor had become so inextricably intertwined
with character Spanky from "Our Gang" series that actor's own identity would be invoked
by the name Spanky).
120 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[A]
celebrity's legal right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally
appropriated for commercial purposes .... .") (emphasis added).
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